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Trent Gaither* and Stephanie McClure**
I. TEXAS PENAL CODE
A. Offenses Against Property
1. Burglary of a Building or Habitation
a. Intent to Commit a Felony or Theft.
I N LaPoint v. State I the defendant was convicted of burglary of a build-
ing. 2 The defendant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the
ury that the act of breaking and entering a building at nighttime raises a
presumption of intent to commit theft. The court of criminal appeals held
that the charge was error because it constituted a comment on the weight of
the evidence. 3 To obtain a conviction for burglary the prosecution must in-
troduce evidence of both unlawful entry and specific intent to commit a theft
or a felony.4 As a question of fact, the jury may infer the requisite intent
from surrounding circumstances. 5 The trial court, however, may not in-
clude this permissive inference in its instruction to the jury as a presumption
provided by law; neither statute nor caselaw provide such a presumption.
6
b. Distinction Between "Habitation" and "Building."
The Corpus Christi court of appeals in Chandler v. State 7 reversed a con-
viction of burglary of a habitation.8 The court found insufficient evidence to
support a jury finding that the burglarized structure was a habitation. 9 The
structure in question was an apartment that was unleased, unfinished, and
* B.B.A, University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston; Attorney at Law, Haynes &
Fullenweider, Houston, Texas.
** B. B.A, J.D., University of Houston; Judicial clerk to the Honorable Karen Brown,
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1. 750 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
2. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) provides: "(a) a person com-
mits an offense if, without effective consent of the owner, he: (1) enters a habitation, or a
building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a
felony or theft .... "
3. 750 S.W.2d at 183.
4. Id. at 182 (citing Greer v. State, 437 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)).
5. Id. at 182.
6. Id.; see also McDonald v. State, 750 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, no pet.) (court of appeals reversed conviction due to similar instruction).
7. 743 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
8. Id. at 742.
9. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.01 (Vernon 1974) (habitation means structure or
vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons).
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vacant at the time of the offense. The apartment contained built-in appli-
ances and a refrigerator, and it remained connected to utilities. The court
found that while the apartment may have been previously suitable for over-
night accommodations, at the time the defendant entered the apartment it
was not actually so adapted, thus the structure was not a habitation.10 Con-
curring Justice Nye discussed the need to clarify the distinction between the
terms "building" and "habitation." He asserted that an increased penalty
for burglary of a habitation will not deter a criminal from entering a private
residence because under the majority's definition the criminal cannot deter-
mine in advance whether a structure is a habitation."I Justice Nye con-
'cluded that the majority's hypertechnical, subjective test merely muddled
the issue and asked the legislature to clarify this area of the law.12
2. Burglary of Vehicles
In Love v. State 13 the defendant was convicted for burglary of a vehicle.
He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support that conviction.
The evidence consisted of the complainant's wire wheel covers that police
recovered from the trunk of the defendant's car.
The state argued that this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain
the conviction. The Houston court of appeals disagreed. Although the
Texas Penal Code' 4 permits conviction for entering "any part" of a vehicle,
the court required proof that the accused actually penetrated the interior of
the vehicle, or part of the vehicle to sustain a conviction.
The court refused to hold that the defendant necessarily removed the
wheel covers by inserting an object between the covers and the wheel bases
of the complainant's vehicle. 15 Thus the evidence failed to show burglarious
entry to the complainant's vehicle and this was insufficient to-support a bur-
glary conviction. 16
3. Criminal Trespass
In Milton v. State 17 the defendant was convicted of criminal trespass. The
10. 743 S.W.2d at 739. The test established by the court of criminal appeals was that the
structure "must at the time of the alleged offense have been actually 'adapted for the overnight
accommodation of persons' or at least at some prior time used for the overnight accommoda-
tion of persons and still 'adapted for the overnight accommodations' of persons." Id. at 737
(quoting Jones v. State, 532 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). Note also that the
court only considered whether a person could have actually inhabitated the premises in the
same condition as the burglar found them. The objective appearance of the structure was
irrelevant. Id. at 738.
11. Id. at 744. Nye proposed that the test should be whether the structure objectively
appears to be a private residence. Id.
12. Id.
13. 744 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd).
14. TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 30.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or any
part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft."
15. 744 S.W.2d at 250.
16. Id.
17. 751 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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defendant, while in a department store, entered an area marked "Stop No
trespassing. Authorized Personnel Only." The defendant argued that he did
not commit the offense of criminal trespass because he did not enter a
"building" without authorization, but merely a prohibited "area" within
that building.18 In support of his argument defendant asserted that unlike
the burglary statutes, the criminal trespass provision does not prohibit en-
trance to "any portion" of a building without consent of the owner.19
Therefore, his entry into an unauthorized area of a building could not consti-
tute a criminal trespass.
The court of appeals found the defendant's interpretation of legislative
intent absurd 20 such an interpretation, for example, would prevent convic-
tion of a person who entered a bank building and then walked behind the
tellers' windows. The court held that it must promote the purpose of




a. Intent to Deprive
Rowland v. State22 involved a defendant convicted of theft of an automo-
bile. 23 In overturning the conviction the court of appeals, found the evi-
dence insufficient to support a conviction of theft.24 The court of appeals
held that to prove the accused intended to deprive the owner of his property,
the state must show that the accused withheld the owner's property either
permanently or for so long as to diminish a majority of the property's value
or enjoyment.25
In reversing the court of appeals, the court of criminal appeals held that
"[d]epreivation is not an element of intent to deprive; therefore, the State
need not prove actual deprivation .... While evidence of actual deprivation
may be evidence of intent to deprive, other evidence may also indicate
whether intent to deprive exists." '26
The court noted that the defendant obtained the owner's property deceit-
18. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) ("A person commits an
offense if he enters or remains on property or in a building of another without effective consent
and he: (1) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or (2) received notice to depart but failed
to do so.").
19. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974) ("A person commits an
offense if, without consent of the owner, he enters a habitation, or a building or any portion of
building not open to the public ..... ) with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a) (Vernon
1988) ("A person commits an offense if he enters ... a building of another without effective
consent .. ") (emphasis added).
20. 751 S.W.2d at 911.
21. Id.
22. 744 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
23. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1988) (theft is the unlawful appropria-
tion of property with intent to deprive the owner of the property).
24. Rowland v. State, 704 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), rev'd, 744 S.W.2d 610
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
25. Id.
26. 744 S.W.2d at 612.
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fully. 27 Subsequently, the defendant did not return the property as promised
and did not contact the owner to offer an explanation.28 The court deter-
mined that from these facts a jury could infer that the defendant had an
intent to deprive the owner of his truck.29 Accordingly, the court found
sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant intended to deprive the owner
of his property.30
5. Criminal Mischief
In Deas v. State3' the defendant was convicted of criminal mischief to
property. The evidence showed that the defendant backed his truck into the
garage door of the complainant and that the complainant replaced the door
for $590.00. The defendant contended that insufficient evidence supported
the jury finding of a pecuniary loss in excess of $200.32
Section 28.06(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides that if property is de-
stroyed, the state must establish pecuniary loss by offering evidence of the
fair market value of the property at the time and place of its destruction or if
the fair market value cannot be ascertained, by offering evidence of the cost
of replacing the property. 33 If the property is merely damaged the state may
established pecuniary loss by offering evidence of the cost to repair or restore
the property.34
In Deas the state submitted only the replacement cost of the property to
show the amount of loss. The defendant argued and the court agreed that to
use replacement cost in calculating pecuniary loss requires proof of de-
stroyed property. 35 The court also agreed with the defendant's alternative
argument that even assuming the proof of destroyed property existed, to use
replacement cost requires proof that the market value of the destroyed prop-
erty is unascertainable. 36 Because the state failed in both instances, the
court overturned the conviction.37
B. Offenses Against Public Administration
1. Escape
In Harrell v. State38 the defendant was convicted of escape pursuant to
section 38.07(a) of the Texas Penal Code. 39 The defendant, while incarcer-




31. 752 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
32. At the time of the offense TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(b)(4)(a) (Vernon 1974)
provided that an offense is a third degree felony if "the amount of penuciary loss is $200 or
more than $10,000."
33. Id. § 28.06(a)(1), (2).
34. Id. § 28.06(b).
35. 752 S.W.2d at 575.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 743 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
39. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.07 (Vernon 1974) ("A person arrested for, charged
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ated in the Kerr County Jail, was hospitalized in the V.A. Hospital in Kerr-
ville. Authorities told the defendant that he was still under arrest and that
departure from the hospital constituted an escape from the county jail. Sub-
sequently, the defendant left the hospital.
The San Antonio court of appeals found the evidence insufficient to show
custody because the state did not physically restrain the defendant at the
V.A. Hospital. 40 The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that actual
physical restraint is not a prerequisite to a showing of custody. 4 I Rather
legal status is the determinative factor.42 Because the defendant remained
under arrest while in the hospital, he was in custody at the time of his depar-
ture and his departure constituted an escape. 43
C. Inchoate Offenses
1. Unlawful Use of a Criminal Instrument
In Eodice v. State" the defendant was convicted of use of a criminal in-
strument pursuant to section 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code.4 5 Upon arrest,
police found a steel pry bar, a bent cotter pin, a filtered lens flashlight, a gap-
feeler gauge, and an electric circuit tester in the defendant's possession. The
court of appeals found that these were not criminal instruments46 but were
ordinary, commonly available tools. 47 The court noted that while a person
could use these items to commit burglary, the state did not show that any of
these objects had been specially designed, made, or adapted for use in the
commission of burglary.48 Therefore, the state failed to prove that the de-
fendant possessed a criminal instrument as that term is defined in section
16.01.49
D. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, and Morals
1. Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Felon
In Ware v. State5 ° the defendant was convicted of violating section
with, or convicted of an offense commits an offense if he escapes from custody.") Section
38.01(2) states: "Custody" means "detained or under arrest by a peace officer or under re-
straint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court." Id. § 38.01(2).
40. Harrell v. State, 699 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985), rev'd, 743 S.W.2d
229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
41. 743 S.W.2d at 231.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 742 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no pet.).
45. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) provides: "A person com-
mits an offense if: (1) he possesses a criminal instrument with intent to use it in the commission
of an offense; or (2) with knowledge of its character and with intent to use or aid or permit
another to use in the commission of the offense, he manufactures, adapts, sells, installs, or sets
up a criminal instrument."
46. Id. § 16.01 (defines criminal instrument as "anything, the possession, manufacture, or
sale of which in not otherwise an offense, that is specially designed, made, or adapted for use in
the commission of an offense").
47. 742 S.W.2d at 847.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 749 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
1989]
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46.05(a) of the Texas Penal Code.5 ' Section 46.05(a) prohibits a person from
possessing a firearm away from where he lives if that person has been previ-
ously convicted of a violent felony. 52 The defendant argued that his prior
conviction of involuntary manslaughter was not a violent felony as a matter
of law. Furthermore, because the state failed to prove that the felony did in
fact involve violence or the threat of violence to either persons or property
the court should overturn his conviction.
The court agreed that involuntary manslaughter is not a violent felony as
a matter of law, but affirmed the conviction.53 The court stated that a per-
son commits a violent act when he possesses a culpable mental state at the
time of the act.54 Accordingly a person cannot commit a violent act by acci-
dent or by mistake.55 When, as an intoxicated driver, that person by acci-
dent or by mistake causes the death of another, every conviction does not, as
a matter of law, involve an act of violence.56 Thus, the court held that a
prior conviction of involuntary manslaughter itself could not satisfy the
state's burden of proof under section 46.05. 57 However, the prosecution, in
this case, had proven that the defendant's prior conviction involved violence
and therefore, the court affirmed the conviction.58
E. Offenses Against the Person
1. Attempted Capital Murder
In Yalch v. State 59 the defendant was convicted of attempted capital mur-
der. The indictment alleged that the defendant attempted to kill a police
officer by shooting him with a gun. The evidence at trial showed that the
defendant fired three or four shots at the officer, but did not hit him. The
court of appeals, relying on Danford v. State,6° reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that when the state alleges attempted murder by "shooting" it must
prove harm to the victim. 61
On appeal the state argued that the Danford opinion, upon which the
lower court relied, was an incorrect interpretation of Windham v. State.62 In
Windham the indictment alleged that the defendant attempted to cause the
death of a person "by shooting at her with a gun." At trial, the state proved
that the defendant pulled the trigger on the gun but that the gun failed to
fire. The court determined that the definition of "shoot" required proof of a
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.05(a) (Vernon 1974) (a person convicted of a violent
felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm away from where he lives).
52. Id.





58. Id. at 855.
59. 743 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
60. 653 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
61. Yalch v. State, No. 3-85-189-CR (Tex. App.-Austin 1986).
62. 638 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
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discharged projectile and thus overturned the conviction.63 The state argued
that under Windham, if the state pleads attempted murder by "shooting,"
then the state must show only that a gun was actually fired. In comparison,
the Danford court misplaced emphasis by holding that if the state alleges
attempted murder by "shooting," then the state must show harm to the
victim. 64
The court of criminal appeals agreed with the state and held that harm, or
lack of it, to the victim is not an element of attempted murder.65 The allega-
tion of attempted murder by "shooting" only requires evidence of a dis-
charged projectile. 66 Whether the victim is struck by the bullet is merely
descriptive of the result of an act that may constitute an attempted
murder. 67
II. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
A. Definition of Intoxicated
In Garcia v. State68 the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxi-
cated. On appeal the defendant argued that the information should be
quashed because it did not give adequate notice whether the intoxication was
caused by alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or any combination
thereof. Article 67011-1(b) provides that a person commits an offense if
while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public place the person is
intoxicated. 69 The term "intoxicated " is defined in article 67011-1 (a)(2) as
either being under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or a
combination of the two.
The court of criminal appeals noted that when a statute defines an act or
omission and the definition provides more than one way to commit the act or
omission, then upon timely request, the state must allege the manner and
means it seeks to establish. 70 Accordingly, the type of intoxicant used in a
prosecution under article 67011-1(b) becomes an element of the offense and
critically necessary to the state's proof.7 1
B. Implied Consent
The Houston court of appeals in Howard v. State 72 held that although the
driving while intoxicated law applies to parking lots, the implied consent law
63. Id. at 488.
64. 653 S.W.2d at 437.
65. 743 S.W.2d at 233.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 747 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
69. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
70. Id. at 380 (citing Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).
71. See also Solis v. State, 742 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.) (de-
fendant's driving while intoxicated conviction was reversed due to inadequate notice as to
whether state was seeking conviction on "loss of faculties" or by "alcohol concentration").
72. 744 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.).
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does not apply when driving on a parking lot.73 Therefore, in the instant
case the motorist's consent to take the blood alcohol test was involuntary,
and the court should have suppressed the test results. The implied consent
law applies to driving on a public highway or public beach but not to driving
on a parking lot. Therefore, defendant's conviction was reversed. 74 The
court noted that the defendant found a loophole that only legislative action
could close. 75
C. Sufficiency
In McCafferty v. State 76 the accused got her car stuck in a construction
area in Houston. Testimony placed the time of driving at 2:30 a.m. A police
officer arrived at 3:50 a.m. and determined the accused to be intoxicated.
She was taken to the station and at 4:45 a.m. was given a breath test, result-
ing in a. 18 reading.77 The court reversed and rendered a judgment of ac-
quittal, holding the evidence insufficient. 78 Relying on standards previously
established in Coleman v. State79 and Weaver v. State,80 the court noted that
indications that the accused is intoxicated at the time the police arrive does
not of itself prove intoxication at the prohibited time, i.e., when the accused
was driving. 8' The state fails to prove its case when it does not present testi-
mony excluding the possibility that the accused did not have anything to
drink prior to the officer's arrest.82 Further, in the instant ease there was no
testimony explaining absorption that would connect a .18 breath test at 4:45
a.m. with the defendant's condition at 2:30 a.m.83
III. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
A. Definition of Actual Delivery
In Conway v. State8 4 the court of appeals defined the term "actual deliv-
ery" as contained in the Controlled Substances Act. 85 The defendant was
charged with delivering a controlled substance by actual transfer. The de-
fendant asserted the evidence was insufficient to support the indictment's
allegation of actual transfer.
The evidence reflected that the defendant handed a paper sack containing
marijuana to Wingard, a third person, who then handed it to Green, an
undercover narcotics officer. The court of criminal appeals determined that
73. Id. at 641.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 748 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
77. Id. at 489-90.
78. Id. at 492.
79. 704 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).
80. 721 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).
81. 748 S.W2d at 491.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 738 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
85. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 1.02(7) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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in the instant case two actual deliveries took place; the first delivery occurred
when the defendant delivered the paper sack to Wingard and the second
when Wingard delivered the paper sack to Green.8 6 Thus, the court deter-
mined that the defendant never actually delivered any marijuana to Green.8 7
The court defined "actual delivery" as completely transferring the real pos-
session and control of a controlled substance from one person to another
person.88
B. Possession
The basis of the conviction in Guiton v. State 89 was possession of heroin.
The heroin was found in a chair cushion in a hotel room rented by the de-
fendant. The court noted that at least one other person had access to the
room.90 Therefore, it held the evidence insufficient to support a convic-
tion.91 Had the contraband been found in a personal item of the defendant,
however, the decision would have been different. 92
In Brunson v. State 93 the defendant was convicted of possession of less
than 28 grams of methamphetamine. The defendant lived in a two-story
apartment with one other person. During the search, the defendant and two
others were on the first floor of the apartment and at least four other individ-
uals entered the apartment. The methamphetamine was found in an upstairs
office area. The court of appeals found insufficient evidence to prove that the
defendant possessed a controlled substance. 94 The court noted the defend-
ant was merely an occupant of the apartment, had not signed the lease, and
had no exclusive control of the apartment; furthermore, no evidence affirma-
tively linked him to the upstairs office. 95
In Watson v. State96 the defendant was convicted of aggravated possession
of cocaine. The court of appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the defendant, an owner/driver of a semi-truck, knowingly possessed
cocaine found in the trailer of his truck. 97 Approximately 600 lbs of cocaine
were found under a load of 800-900 bags of onions in defendant's truck.
86. Conaway v. State, 738 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
87. 738 S.W.2d at 694. The court noted that the law of parties was neither invoked nor
applied. If so, then defendant would be subject to being convicted of actual delivery of the
substance.
88. Id. at 695. Justice McCormick in his dissent urged that this definition restricts the
term "actual delivery" to but one simple transaction. Id. at 699. The evidence must show that
the defendant personally and manually possessed the contraband and that he physically
handed the contraband directly to the transferee and that the transferee personally, manually,
and physically received the counterband. Id. at 699.
89. 742 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. 750 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet ref'd).
94. Id. at 281.
95. Two writing tablet covers with a handwritten "T" at the top were also found in the
office. The court found that the writing tablets did not provide a sufficient link to prove owner-
ship or control. Id. at 280.
96. 752 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, pet. ref'd).
97. Id. at 223.
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Although the defendant was both owner and driver of the truck, no evidence
existed to show that the defendant entered the trailer once it was loaded with
the onions. The court of appeals held that in the instant case, where a truck
driver is commercial in nature, the fact that he owns and drives the truck
does not automatically make him aware the drug is present.98 Mere pres-
ence in the vicinity of the drug does not establish that the defendant know-
ingly possesses the cocaine.99 While the evidence did cast some suspicion on
the defendant, the affirmative links between him and the cocaine failed to
eliminate the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was entirely unaware
of the cocaine's presence.l°°
C. "Adulterant" and "Dilutant"
The court of criminal appeals in McGlothlin v. State 10' defined the terms
"adulterant" and "dilutant" as used in the Controlled Substances Act. In
McGlothlin the defendant was convicted of possession of amphetamine of an
aggregate weight, including any adulterants or dilutants, of more than 400
grams under Controlled Substances Act. 102 The defendant argued that the
quantity of amphetamine was not over 400 grams.
The facts reflected that the seized amphetamine solutions had a total gross
weight of 3118 grams. The solutions were split in two layers, the larger layer
being an aqueous layer. The aqueous layer, described as mostly water, con-
tained only a residual amount of amphetamine. The issue before the court
was whether the terms adulterant and dilutant as used in article 4476-15,
§ 4042(d)(2) meant to encompass aqueous solution.
After reviewing legislative intent and applying standard rules of statutory
construction and interpretation, the court found that an adulterant or a
dilutant is a compound, substance, or solution added to the controlled sub-
stance with the intent to increase the bulk or quantity of the final product. 10 3
The court found that there was no evidence pertaining to the reason or pur-
pose for the presence of the water in the solution. 104 Therefore, it cannot be
said that the water was an adulterant or a dilutant and the conviction was
reversed. 105
D. Forfeiture
In MBank Grand Prairie v. State 10 6 a judgment was entered ordering for-
feiture of a truck to the State of Texas free of any interest held by MBank.
The Fort Worth court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that
98. Id. at 222-23.
99. Id. at 223.
100. Id. at 222.
101. 749 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
102. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.041(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
103. 749 S.W.2d at 858-59.
104. Id. at 861.
105. See Engleking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
106. 737 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no pet.).
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MBank held a bona fide interest.1 0 7
The appellant, MBank, entered into a finance agreement with Gary Gil-
bert for the financing of a 1984 Chevrolet truck. A promissory note was
signed by Gilbert along with a security agreement. Subsequent to the sign-
ing, Gilbert was arrested, both for conspiracy to distribute a controlled sub-
stance and for theft. The state petitioned the trial court to forfeit the vehicle
pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether a party holding an un-
perfected security interest has a "bona fide" security interest under section
5.03(c) of the Controlled Substances Act. Section 5.03(c) provides in part:
"A forfeiture of property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is sub-
ject to the interest of the second party if he neither had knowledge of or
consented to the act which caused the property to be subject to forfei-
ture."10 8 The court of appeals, after reviewing the relevant provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, the Business and Commerce Code, and the Cer-
tificate of Title Act, held that MBank held a bona fide security interest. 10 9
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
In Ex Parte Rutlege 0 the court of criminal appeals declared an amend-
ment to the Prison Management Act (PMA)"'I unconstitutional. 1 2 The
PMA was passed to control prison overcrowding. According to the Act,
when the Texas Department of Corrections reaches an occupancy level of
ninety-five percent, certain classes of inmates automatically become eligible
for a grant of thirty days administrative good time." 3 The grant has the
effect of advancing the inmates' parole eligibility and parole review date." 4
Eligibility for the grant is based solely upon the statutory classification of the
inmates' offense.' '5
The applicant" 6 was convicted of possession of a controlled substance.
Under the version of the PMA in effect at the time of the commission of his
offense, the applicant would have been eligible for the grant of good time on
each occasion the PMA was triggered. Subsequent to the applicant's being
incarcerated, the PMA was amended. The result was that a number of of-
fenses were statutorily designated as being ineligible for the grant of good
time. The applicant's offense was one of these.
The court held that retrospective application of the amendment violated
both state and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 117 Accord-
107. Id. at 427.
108. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4476-15, § 5.03(c) (Vernon 1976).
109. 737 S.W.2d at 427.
110. 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
111. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6184o (Vernon Supp. 1989).
112. 741 S.W.2d at 462.
113. Id. at 460.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. This issue reached the court of criminal appeals by way of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977).
117. Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim App. 1987).
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ingly, the applicant's eligibility for parole was to be determined in accord-
ance with the version of article 6184o in effect at the time of the offense for
which he was convicted." 18
In Dougherty v. State 119 the court of appeals held that a statute that pre-
cludes an officer from making an arrest unless dressed in specific attire is
unconstitutional. 20 The statute in part, reads as follows:
No Sheriff, Constable, or Deputy or either, shall have authority to
arrest or accost any person for driving a motor vehicle over the high-
ways of this State in violation of the law ... unless he is at the time
wearing on his left breast on the outside of his garment ... a badge
showing his title, and ... a cap, coat, or blouse and trousers of dark
grey color or dark blue, which cap and other uniform shall be of the
same color. 121
The court relied on Scoggins v. State,122 a 1931 case that held a similar stat-
ute unconstitutional. In Scoggins the court held that article 670ld-8 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes was unconstitutional. 123 The statute forbade an
officer to make an arrest for violation of automobile speed laws "unless he
wear a diamond-shaped badge and a cap, coat, and trousers of blue or dark
grey." 124
118. Id. at 462-63.
119. 745 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, pet. granted).
120. Id. at 109.
121. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701-d (Vernon 1977).
122. 117 Tex. Crim. 294, 38 S.W.2d 592 (1931).
123. 38 S.W.2d at 593.
124. Id.
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